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Nicholson: Workmen's Compensation

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
WILIAm H. NICHOLSON, JR.*

Deduction or Offset from Award by Employer
In the case of Wall v. C. Y. Thomason Co.' it was held that
an award having been made by the hearing commissioner,
which award had not been appealed from, the rendition of
judgment by the Court of Common Pleas in accordance with
the award became mandatory under the provisions of section
72-357 of the 1952 Code, and that advances allegedly made by
the employer but not presented at the hearing before the commissioner could not be deducted. The employer contended
that it was entitled to a reference to determine the merits of
the offset claimed under the provision of Code section 72-172,
but the Court held that section applicable only to payments
made by the employer with the approval of the commission
and before the final award.
Formulafor PartialSpecific Losses
The Supreme Court in the case of G. E. Moore Co. v. Walker2 nullified an attempt by the majority of the Industrial
Commission to change by rule the formula theretofore followed in computing compensation for partial loss, or for partial loss of use of various members of the body, as enumerated
in section 72-153.
The formula which the commission sought to change was as
follows:
Maximum number of weeks compensable for total specific
loss X the percentage of specific loss X the weekly compensable rate (60% of average weekly wage, but not
more than $35.00, nor less than $5.00).
The following would have been substituted:
Average weekly wage X compensation rate X percentage
of anatomical loss for the statutory period as specified.
In permanently enjoining enforcement of the latter formula
the Supreme Court referred to the fact that the former had
been the prevailing view from the time of enactment of the
*Member of the firm of Nicholson & Nicholson, Greenwood; LL.B.,
1943, University of South

Carolina.

1. 232 S. C. 153, 101 S. E. 2d 286 (1957).
2. 232 S. C. 320, 102 S. E. 2d 106 (1958).
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Workmen's Compensation law in South Carolina in 1935 to
adoption of the new formula in 1957 without challenge or
legislative amendment, and that it was in accord with the
construction given similar statutes by most of the courts of
other jurisdictions. It was held that the new formula, if
enforced, would nullify the rule of proportion for partial incapacity. "For instance, under the new rule an employee
earning $90 a week would receive exactly the same compensation for 65% loss of the arm as for a 100% loss and an
employee earning $40 a week would receive exactly the same
compensation for 20%o loss of the arm as for a 57o loss."
Necessity for Specific FactualFindingsby Commission
Two cases reported during the survey period were remanded
to the Industrial Commission for findings of fact. In the first,
the case of Gray v. Laurens Mill,3 the question involved was
whether the employer had been prejudiced and the claimant
had reasonable excuse for failing to give notice of the accident
as required by provision of Code of Laws of South Carolina,
1952, sections 72-301 and 72-302. A mere finding of the hearing commissioner that "the employer had knowledge of the
accident and was not prejudiced by the delay in giving formal
notice" was held insufficient, there being no finding of "reasonable excuse". The Court held that there should be specific
findings in the award of "reasonable excuse" and "lack of
prejudice" with discussion of the facts upon which such findings are based.
In the other case remanded, Frady v. Pacific Mills,4 it was
held that the commission erred in not making specific findings
as to the duration of temporary total disability, and, on the
question of partial disability, as to what the claimant was able
to earn after the injury.
Effect of Conclusive Presumptionof Dependency
For the first time the Supreme Court of South Carolina
declared what had been the construction adhered to by the
Industrial Commission, that a widow conclusively presumed
to be dependent upon a deceased employee under the provision
of Code section 72-161 does not take to the exclusion of a
person held to be toatlly dependent under Section 72-162. In
3. 231 S. C. 488, 99 S. E. 2d 36 (1957).
4. 231 S. C. 601, 99 S. E. 2d 398 (1957).
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the case of Bus& v. Gingrey Brothers5 a mother, found as a
fact to be wholly dependent upon the deceased worker, was
held entitled to share equally with the widow.

5. 232 S. C. 20, 100 S. E. 2d 821 (1957).
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